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WITHIN TH E W ORLD OF MARXIST THEORY western Marx­
ism has developed in richness and responsiveness to reality to the 
very extent that it has disengaged itself from the scholastification 
and dogmatisation of M arx’s thought by the Soviet diamat.1 But 
at this moment there has emerged within western Marxism itself, 
an interpretation of Marx which shows no intense theoretical 
quarrel with the diamat but rather turns against the whole of 
western Marxism within which it was nurtured, an interpretation 
of Marxism as a ‘science’, an interpretation which summons up 
the whole nexus of dogmatics associated with the centrality of 
D a s  K a p ita l, economic determinism, antihumanism, and dialectical 
materialism as Marxist philosophy. Do we have in this interpreta­
tion whose centre is Louis Althusser, dogmatism returned in 
disguise inveighing against western Marxism’s non-scientificity, 
Hegelianism and humanism, a dogmatism that argues for Marxist 
‘science’ from the standpoint of Marxist ‘science’?
To be sure this circularity is the difficulty encountered in reading 
Althusser: he argues from the standpoint that is to be argued and is 
it any wonder then that his nominated adversaries crumble in 
the face of his arguments? Their conceptual complex which views
l By western M arxism we m ean those schools born  ou t of Lukacs' W hat is 
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Marxism as a theory of freedom, as the realisation of Reason, as 
the critique of alienation; a self-admitted non-scientific complex 
was born in the very struggle of freeing Marxism from its scientistic 
interpretation. For western Marxism scientism is positivism 
incarnate and its whole critique was a critique of positivism! 
Marx himself provides the framework with which to understand 
positivism whatever its form as ideology and with this the ideological 
function of science itself could be demonstrated.2 This was trans­
parent in the case of Soviet Marxist science. Theoretical truth 
(non-ideology) could only be established through a retreat from 
ideology (scientific or otherwise) into anti-positivism, that is in 
the suppressed tradition of Western critical philosophy itself. It 
was easy then to see how Marxism inherited this tradition and 
how it could be turned against the ideological dogmatics of the 
diamat. Theoretical emancipation from ideology occurred in 
critical (philosophical-social) theory.
Perhaps it is this very retreat that has persuaded western 
Marxists to bypass or overlook recent developments in the philo­
sophy and historiography of science. These developments have 
produced an understanding of the phenomenon of scientificity that 
renders the anti-positivist critique of science obsolete to the extent 
that the critique was only a critique of the positivist self-conception 
of science, a conception obsessed with methodology and principles 
of verification (and falsification). Science had been taken at its 
empirical word, its positivistic mode of conceptualisation brutalised 
reality into conformity with its a priori conceptualisation (that 
is, it identified it operationally and expressed its quantitatively) 
and failed to disclose it in its rich and contradictory character. 
Science was anti-dialectical, and ignored its social-transcendental 
interest in controlling and dominating nature and thereby man, from 
the standpoint of Marxist critical theory.
But Althusser does not revive an old feud for this time both 
the positivist self-conception of science and Marxism as critical 
theory are ideological, that is Althusser’s argument is not conducted 
from the standpoint of positivist Marxist scientism (though it would 
seem to have a spiritual affinity with it) but from the standpoint 
of the recent non-positivist conception of scientificity, a standpoint 
that western Marxism has not hitherto confronted. But unlike 
Marcuse who has the unique privilege of having been attacked 
from both (or all) sides, Althusser is gaining a considerable and 
disciplined following within the west itself and this becomes
-  T h e  m ost readily accessible exposition of this view is contained in  H erbert 
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baffling when his standpoint can easily be mistaken for an old 
one. Could this following be a new rush of dogmatism and 
scholastification? Is it instead a new plunder of M arx’s thought 
for a ‘structuralist sociology'? (We all know that plunderings by 
positive sociology and their subsequent distortions of Marx’s 
thought has been the subject of prodigious attack by western 
Marxists.) But neither is the case.
For the impact of Althusser is located precisely in his conception 
of science (or scientificity if we would still confuse it with the 
positivist self-conception). It would be easy to discredit Althusser 
for his apparent failure to define what he means by ‘science’ and 
for failing to give a definite distinction between science and 
ideology, for these are indeed the fundamental concepts of Althus­
ser’s whole work. However, a concerted study of Althusser will 
show this distinction to be well founded and precise given the 
complexity and originality of the conception of science being 
forged —  a conception of science that submits to no discrete 
definition and which is in principle anti-empirical! But to establish 
this apparent paradox as in fact theoretically adequate is none 
other than to understand Althusser. We come to see how Marxism 
is a science because we have established the true character of 
scientificity itself. For Althusser Marxism is a science in a way 
that the anti-positivist critique has never been able to disclose 
in spite of its apparently thorough critique of science.
So for a start Althusser’s Marxist science is not a new social 
science (as a ‘structuralist sociology’) more adequate to the professed 
principles of social science (in the way that the plunder of such 
Marxist concepts as ‘class’, ‘alienation’ and ‘reification’ was thought 
to make it more adequate). Dialectical materialism is its name 
(but not the dialectical materialist conception of society and nature 
as founded by Engels and inscribed in the diamat), rather it is 
properly understood as Marx’s theory of theory or meta-theory, 
Marxist philosophy in the narrow sense. But, Althusser argues, 
it was never properly formulated by Marx himself but rather 
operates in a ‘practical state’ in Marx’s definitive work, Capital, 
and as Lacan gave psychoanalysis its proper theoretical formula­
tion which Freud could not do’:t Althusser takes it upon himself 
to articulate for Marx his theory, to bring it out of its practical 
state into theoretical consciousness. And he shows that the theory 
Marx worked with was never a methodology in an explicit sense 
but rather a conception of scientificity appropriate to its object. 
Additional to raising to theoretical consciousness Marx’s own theory
•i See A lthusser’s article, ‘F reud and Lacan’ in N ew  L e ft Review , 55, (M ay/June 
1969).
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and coincidental with it, Althusser for the first time elevates to 
conceptual form what the object of Marx’s theory was. This is the 
whole difficulty we have in reading Capital, that a double discovery 
was made, the discovery of a new object for theory and a new 
conception of scientificity while neither was properly conceptualised 
or given conscious theoretical form. Althusser disengages and then 
reestablishes what he calls the ‘discourse-object unity’ of Capital 
and shows that it is necessary to do so if we are to read Capital 
rather than read into Capital philosophical conceptions that derive 
elsewhere, specifically from the Young Marx.
Perhaps it would be a circular argument from the standpoint of 
western Marxism however if the conception of science that Marx 
worked in was not fundamentally compatible with the recent 
non-positivist critique of the positivist self-conception of science 
being produced. Althusser indicates to this critique —  “look into 
Capital, there it is already, ahead of its time!” Of course it was 
always there in all the great founding moments of science, in 
Galileo, Lavosier and so on, but the positivist self-conception could 
not see it. For the latter Galileo and Lavosier were scientists but 
not Marx —  and here western Marxists would agree —  but for 
opposite reasons. Marx must now join Galileo and Lavosier 
because, despite the uniqueness of the object of his science (being 
non-natural) his approach was scientifically adequate to his object. 
The positivist self-conception of science has as it were, confused 
science with the study of a particular type of object (the natural) 
and has always thought of scientificity in terms of the naturalness 
of its object, that is, it confuses science with its practice on a 
particular type of object. Of course social science adopts the 
methods of the positivist conception and applies them to a 
fundamentally different object, but methods appropriate only to a 
particular type of object (the natural). Small wonder that the 
anti-positivist critique of social scence as the reduction of the 
human world to the form of the natural-quantitative, is so successful.
We can insist that it is the very character of scientificity that 
in its epistemological source the possible questions it asks of 
its object be open in principle and not intimidated by guarantees 
(as inferred by some formalised Subject/Object relation) as to the 
form of its answers; that only then does it establish its methods 
and criteria of apodicticity and proof appropriate to the level at 
which the questions are asked. Compare the positivist conception 
which identifies science firstly with its method which demands that 
questions be formulated appropriate to the method and not the 
object. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions4 which is 
at the centre of the new developments in the historiography of
* T h e  U niversity of Chicago Press. London. 1962.
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science in the English-speaking world, shows that scientific revo­
lutions are founded on intuition and intelligence and not on the 
application of pre-prdained scientific methods such that if we 
identify science only as what he calls ‘normal’ or established science, 
we cannot understand revolutionary discovery in the history of 
science. As Althusser shows too, scientific discovery arrives rather 
as a surprise than as the goal of scientific reasoning.5 It is 
established reasoning that does not permit the asking of ‘open’ 
questions, that is, it does not permit scientific discovery except 
in the form of ‘puzzle solving’ for which guarantees are already 
set up. A new conception of reality may produce questions which 
rest latent for centuries (as Aristarchus founded long before 
Copernicus) but its questions become scientific not when a method is 
provided but when a theory as a theory of its object is produced. 
Science is not born when a new question is asked but only when a 
theory of its object is produced, only then can we say a new object is 
discovered as a new object, when it is given theoretical form (or 
as Kuhn would say, a paradigm). The asking of an open question 
only becomes a scientific discovery when a theory of its object 
is produced and only then do principles of proof and apodicticity 
(i.e., method) follow appropriate to that theory (as phlogiston theory 
was not the theory with which Priestley could ask questions of 
de-phlogisticated air). This often means that such a radical 
revision of the previous theory (or paradigm) that in fact a new 
theory takes its place, a rupture so deep that even new episte- 
mological principles must be worked out.
On insisting that such a rupture took place in Marx against 
his Early Works as well as Classical Political Economy, Althusser 
is justified in regarding the Early Works as ideological and not 
scientific precisely because he thought in an empirical idealist 
theory (or problematic) which epistemologically set up guarantees 
for the questions he asked. To discover the cornerstone of the 
objects of his science, surplus value, Marx had to produce a 
theory of the concept of his object which the anthropological 
framework of both the Early Works and of Classical Political 
Economy could not provide him. An epistemology which insists 
that it disclose man’s self-formative processes would both guarantee 
an answer and fail to discover surplus value.
If then a science, what of the relation of theory to practice? 
The theoretical solution of, say, Lukacs, and the theoretical non­
solution of Marcuse cease to be relevant. Althusser insists that 
Marx’s theory is practical because it is true, not that it is true 
because it has succeeded in practice.1 When Marcuse claims that
"« R eading Capital (New Left Books, London. 1970) p. 45.
8 Reading Capital, p. 59.
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theory preserves the truth, though practice may deviate from its 
proper path,7 he is referring to what seems to be an established 
‘truth’ which leaves the theoretician only to speculate on what 
has become of the ‘proper path’. This may deem Marxism as a 
critical social theory but not as a science, a practical science in a 
similar way to which natural science is practical (that is, not 
because we can find a use for its discoveries but because it 
approaches its object in a practical way and not as it ought to be). 
Science tells us what its object is and not what it ought to be. 
Natural science becomes ideological when it is no longer practical 
in this sense, when it seeks guarantees for what its results ought 
to be. A theory which examines society from the standpoint of 
its socialist ought-to-be and goal (western Marxism and Soviet 
scientism respectively) is not scientific regardless of its methods 
because its questions are not open. So theory and practice remain 
categorically different and mutually irreducible. There is no 
unification on the side of practice for that would destroy the 
possibility of science and no unification on the side of theory for 
that would be to renounce politics, there can only be a genuine 
unification in the individual. This is how Marxism is a revolution­
ary theory but only its scientificity can make it a theory of 
revolution. The latter does not produce an impatient unification 
because it recognises the specificity of revolutionary practice.
Perhaps it is at this point that we find Althusser lacking. His 
analysis of the production of knowledge correctly allocates for such 
processes as intuition an original place in the processes of knowing, 
as the irreducible elements of scientific discovery. But he speaks 
only of the individual Marx midst the raw materials of his 
productions. Kuhn saw the need to postscript his second edition 
on this very point, but integral to understanding both scientific 
discovery and the practice of normal science, the social context 
must be included as contributory, that is, science is only practised 
in a scientific community. For us, what community would practise 
Marxist science, the bourgeois establishment? Althusser would 
doubtless answer with the Party and that would leave interest in 
the science to some pre-scientific political commitment. But other 
than that Althusser has not established the contextual factors which 
define the epistemological sphere which establishes intuition as 
rigorous to the practice of its science and not as mere guesswork 
or wishful thinking. It is in a community that any science its 
practised and not through adherence to theoretical principles alone. 
It is easy to see in the natural sciences though their communities 
are more homogenous and esoteric, that the community confirms 
the practice once a science is founded, it provides both a definition
" H erbert M arcuse Reason and R evolution . (New York, 1954) p. 322.
58 A U STR AL IA N  LEFT REVIEW — JULY, 1971
of its knowledge and gives intuition, etc., its pre-epistemological 
direction. The only guarantee that bourgeois social science could 
not take up Marxist science willy nilly lies in the community 
which provides the basis of practical judgement about the raw 
materials of its knowledge.
But this is not to assert that a certain ‘interest’ guides knowledge 
other than the interest of scientificity itself, that asking of open 
questions which alone lead to scientific knowledge. But then do 
we forsake the critical-emancipatory character of Marx’s theory 
for cold science? We could defend Althusser by saying these 
omissions of the ‘spirit’ of Marxism are returned at the level of 
Party membership where they return mediately in the spirit of 
the community that practises the science while it does not exist 
immediately in the theory.
But this is needless because we can go straight to the spirit of 
Althusser’s Marxism in the science itself. Through science itself 
there is always a nexus of (scientific) knowledge and revolution 
for the object of Marxist science in its real existence contains 
within itself the potential for revolution. That is, bourgeois social 
science need not be internally governed by an interest for social 
control but rather its epistemological principles foreclose it from 
knowing its object because it has no proper theory of its object. 
The world (whether social or natural) cannot be submitted to 
determined change unless it is scientifically known. The inescapable 
problem of determined judgment, of decision, can be exercised 
only from knowing what one judges and decides to act upon. 
What could be less dogmatic and less scholastic?
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